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INTRODUCTION
In the late 1980s, a striped menace made its first appearance in
North America.1 A native of the Black, Caspian, and Azov Seas, the
zebra mussel appeared in Lake St. Clair in Canada.2 The pestilent
mussel found its way into major rivers and other waterways, and
quickly proliferated into the United States.3 Within two years, the
zebra mussel had invaded every Great Lake.4 The mussel caused,
and still causes, rampant economic and environmental harm.5
Indeed, once introduced, the invasive zebra mussel not only disrupts
industry by colonizing in facilities’ water pipes but also devastates
populations of native organisms, thereby disturbing the ecological
equilibrium of the invaded area.6 But how did a mussel native to
Eastern Europe and Western Asia get to North America in the first
instance? “A release of larval mussels during the ballast exchange
of a single commercial cargo ship traveling from the north shore of
the Black Sea to the Great Lakes has been deduced as the likely
vector of introduction to North America.”7
Presently, the possibility of a zebra mussel-like catastrophe oc-
curring in the Arctic is growing.8 Human activity levels in the Arctic
are increasing and will continue to do so should current climate
change trends continue.9 From industry and trade, to national se-
curity and even recreation, the world will access the Arctic for its
1. See Amy Benson et al., Dreissena polymorpha, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, https://nas.
er.usgs.gov/queries/FactSheet.aspx?speciesID=5 [https://perma.cc/V6RG-W2ZT] (last modified
Mar. 21, 2018).
2. Id.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. Id. (citing Robert F. McMahon, The Physiological Ecology of the Zebra Mussel,
Dreissena Polymorpha, in North America and Europe, 36 AM. ZOOLOGIST 339 (1996)).
8. See Taylor Simpson-Wood, Changes in Latitudes Call for Changes in Attitudes: To-
wards Recognition of a Global Imperative for Stewardship, Not Exploitation, in the Arctic, 37
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1239, 1253 (2014).
9. See Peter G. Pamel & Robert C. Wilkins, Challenges of Northern Resource Develop-
ment and Arctic Shipping, 29 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES L. 333, 333-36 (2011); Simpson-
Wood, supra note 8, at 1242.
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resources as it becomes more accessible.10 With increased activity
comes the side effects of human endeavor,11 including the environ-
mental side effects of commercial vessel shipping.12 As waterways
such as the Northwest Passage become increasingly passable now
and in the future, commercial vessel traffic in the Arctic will in-
crease.13 Because of this increase, the introduction of nonindigenous
aquatic invasive (or “nuisance”) species14 into Arctic ecosystems via
vessel ballast water discharge—a problem known to the rest of the
navigable world for over a century15—is becoming a proposition of
“when” rather than “if.”16 Indeed, “a disastrous outcome has already
been predicted for the Arctic.”17
Aquatic invasive species transfer is a serious threat to the world’s
aquatic ecosystems.18 International (and domestic) instruments
such as the International Convention for the Control and Manage-
ment of Ships' Ballast Water and Sediments (BWMC) seek to reg-
ulate vessels and their ballast water to reduce and eventually
eradicate such transfers.19 Now that the BWMC has entered into
10. Pamel & Wilkins, supra note 9, at 334-35; Lesley Stahl, The Arctic Frontier, CBS
NEWS (Sept. 10, 2017), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/60-minutes-arctic-frontier-lesley-stahl-
2/ [https://perma.cc/U8NS-GJEE]; see also U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., REPORT TO CONGRESS ON
STRATEGY TO PROTECT UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS IN THE ARCTIC RE-
GION 2-3, 15 (2016) (demonstrating the level of U.S. involvement in the Arctic by outlining
evolving national security and other policies).
11. See Angie Lyne Fredrickson, Note, The Ice-Free Arctic is Coming: Why a Circumpolar
Network of Marine Protected Areas is Needed to Protect Arctic Fisheries from Climate Change,
8 DREXEL L. REV. 185, 197-98 (2015).
12. See Simpson-Wood, supra note 8, at 1251-52.
13. See id. at 1239-45.
14. For definitions, see infra Part I.A.
15. See MD SAIFUL KARIM, PREVENTION OF POLLUTION OF THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT FROM
VESSELS 67-68 (2015). The 1980s ushered in the modern campaign against aquatic invasive
species when the United States, Australia, and Canada came to the IMO with findings of
foreign organisms in the Great Lakes. See id. at 68; ALAN KHEE-JIN TAN, VESSEL-SOURCE
MARINE POLLUTION: THE LAW AND POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL REGULATION 169 (2006); see
also Benson et al., supra note 1.
16. See Simpson-Wood, supra note 8, at 1252-53.
17. Id. at 1253.
18. See infra Part I.A.
19. INT’L MAR. ORG., Adoption of the Final Act and Any Instruments, Recommendations
and Resolutions Resulting from the Work of the Conference: International Convention for the
Control and Management of Ships' Ballast Water and Sediments, 2004, annex at 2, IMO Doc.
BWM/CONF/36 (Feb. 16, 2004), [hereinafter BWMC] http://www.bsh.de/de/Meeresdaten/
Umweltschutz/Ballastwasser/Konvention_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/2JYJ-YUMR]. For back-
ground on ballast water regulation and the BWMC, see infra Parts I.A-B.
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force,20 it is critical to consider potential implementation issues that
have received limited exploration during the ratification period. In
an effort to begin a critical discourse, this Note closely examines one
such issue: ships’ undue delay and detention during compliance
inspections.21
To meet its invasive species mitigation objectives, the BWMC au-
thorizes, among other things, the inspection of vessels for compli-
ance with other BWMC provisions.22 These inspections may include
checking for required documentation and logbooks, as well as
testing ships’ ballast water while in port.23 According to the BWMC,
a ship may not be “unduly detained or delayed” during, or as a
result of, such inspections.24 However, due to the lack of any def-
inition of “unduly,” there is an inherent tension between the undue
delay and detention provisions and the BWMC’s overall objectives.25
This Note argues that to avoid undermining the BWMC’s purpose
and efficacy, the undue delay and detention provisions can and
should be read such that the standard for what constitutes “un-
due”26 takes into consideration the location of the compliance inspec-
tion (a “geography-dependent” standard).27
Part I of this Note provides background regarding ballast water
regulation and introduces relevant BWMC provisions. Part II con-
ducts a close textual analysis of the BWMC, arguing that the undue
delay and detention provisions can be read to contemplate a geogra-
phy-dependent standard. Part III first argues that the undue delay
20. See infra text accompanying note 56.
21. While undue delay and detention appear in other BWMC Articles, see, e.g., BWMC,
supra note 19, art. 7, this Note is limited to Article 9 and Article 12’s applicability to Articles
9 and 10. This narrow focus provides for a close look at the impact of textual ambiguity on
vessel compliance inspections, a vital BWMC enforcement mechanism. Further, one could
extrapolate the Articles 9 and 12 analyses to the other BWMC undue delay and detention
provisions.
22. See id. art. 9.
23. Id. ¶ 1, (a)-(c).
24. Id. art. 12, ¶ 1; see also id. arts. 9-10 (discussing the power to detain ships).
25. See Suzanne Bostrom, Halting the Hitchhikers: Challenges and Opportunities for
Controlling Ballast Water Discharges and Aquatic Invasive Species, 39 ENVTL. L. 867, 891
(2009).
26. For the purposes of this Note, differences in the grammatical form of “undue” as they
are found throughout the BWMC are considered nugatory; “undue” and “unduly” are used
interchangeably depending on sentence structure, and so on.
27. See infra Parts II-III.
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and detention provisions should be read to contemplate a dynamic,
flexible standard as a general matter, and then argues specifically
for the geography-dependent standard. A brief conclusion follows.
I. BACKGROUND
A. What Is Ballast Water and Why Is It Regulated?
“A ship takes on and discharges ballast water to compensate for
changes in its weight caused by activities such as loading and
unloading cargo or consuming fuel or supplies.”28 Compensating for
changes in weight stabilizes the vessel at sea.29 A vessel carrying a
lighter load will carry more ballast water.30 Depending on its size,
a vessel can take on upwards of twenty-five million gallons of
ballast water.31 A vessel usually takes on ballast water at the most
recent port of call and relinquishes the ballast water either at the
next port or “en route in shallower water or calmer seas.”32 Regulat-
ing ballast water transfer in ports and shallow water is imperative
because these are effectively the only places where a vessel can
safely take on or release ballast water.33
While estimates vary, global commercial shipping activity trans-
fers several billion tons of ballast water annually.34 Given this
immense volume, the incidental collection of organisms, pollutants,
and sediments during ballast water intake may come as no sur-
prise.35 Among the “hitchhikers” are aquatic invasive species, con-
sidered to be one of the most serious threats to the world’s aquatic
ecosystems.36 As defined in the BWMC, aquatic invasive species, or
28. Nat. Res. Def. Council v. U.S. EPA, 808 F.3d 556, 561 (2d Cir. 2015).
29. See Ballast Water FAQs, TROJAN MARINEX, https://www.trojanmarinex.com/faqs/
[https://perma.cc/VP2Y-QFBW].
30. MICHAEL BYERS WITH JAMES BAKER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ARCTIC 188 (2013).
31. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 808 F.3d at 561.
32. BYERS WITH BAKER, supra note 30, at 188. 
33. See id. at 189; see also TAN, supra note 15, at 170.
34. See, e.g., Bostrom, supra note 25, at 872.
35. See Nat. Res. Def. Council, 808 F.3d at 561 (citing Nw. Envtl. Advocates v. U.S. EPA,
537 F.3d 1006, 1013 (9th Cir. 2008)); Bostrom, supra note 25, at 872.
36. Bostrom, supra note 25, at 872, 913; see also MARIA HELENA FONSECA DE SOUZA
ROLIM, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON BALLAST WATER: PREVENTING BIOPOLLUTION 9 (2008)
(“[T]he alien species carried in ballast water are one of the greatest agents of global marine
environmental biopollution.”). 
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“‘Harmful Aquatic Organisms and Pathogens[,]’ means aquatic
organisms or pathogens which, if introduced into the sea including
estuaries, or into fresh water courses, may create hazards to the
environment, human health, property or resources, impair biological
diversity[,] or interfere with other legitimate uses of such areas.”37
Ranging from goby to toxic algae, and of course, zebra mussels,38
aquatic invasive species can cause severe environmental and eco-
nomic harm in non-native ecosystems.39 Aquatic invasive species
diminish native species populations by (1) outhunting them for food,
or simply hunting them; (2) “interbreeding with them;” or (3) “in-
troducing harmful pathogens and parasites” into the ecosystem.40
Invasive species also impair ecosystems by disturbing natural pro-
cesses such as hydrological or nutrient cycles.41
Invasive species invasions carry a staggering price tag. In the
United States alone, land-based and aquatic invasive species cause
an estimated $137 billion in damage annually.42 Introduced to the
Black Sea via ballast water transfer in the early 1980s, the comb
jelly decimated the fishing industry and cost the region an esti-
37. BWMC, supra note 19, art. 1, ¶ 8. Other domestic and international definitions are
substantively similar. See, e.g., National Invasive Species Act of 1996 (NISA), 16 U.S.C.
§ 4702(1) (2012).
38. See Steve Raaymakers & Liz Gould, Ten of the Most Unwanted, GLOBAL BALLAST
WATER MGMT. PROGRAMME, http://archive.iwlearn.net/globallast.imo.org/wp-content/uploads/
2015/01/TenMostWanted_English.pdf [https://perma.cc/4CNB-CRQ8]; see also Benson et al.,
supra note 1.
39. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 4701(a)(4); see also Sabrina J. Lovell et al., The Economic Impacts
of Aquatic Invasive Species: A Review of the Literature, 35 AGRIC. & RES. ECON. REV. 195, 195-
96 (2006) (reviewing economic literature regarding the costs associated with invasive species
invasions); Benson et al., supra note 1.
40. What are ANS?, ANS TASK FORCE, http://anstaskforce.gov/ans.php [https://perma.cc/
3Z7N-LLBP].
41. See id. For a brief introduction to hydrology, the scientific study of water’s properties
and movement on Earth, see generally What is Hydrology and What Do Hydrologists Do?, U.S.
GEOLOGICAL SUR., https://water.usgs.gov/edu/hydrology.html [https://perma.cc/GD9W-6E7G]
(last modified Dec. 2, 2016). For information on nutrient cycles, the processes by which the
Earth recycles vital nutrients, see generally Regina Bailey, How Nutrients Cycle Through The
Environment, THOUGHTCO., https://www.thoughtco.com/all-about-the-nutrient-cycle-373411
[https://perma.cc/68QX-QMX5] (last updated Nov. 7, 2017).
42. Eric V. Hull, Climate Change and Aquatic Invasive Species: Building Coastal
Resilience Through Integrated Ecosystem Management, 25 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 51, 56-57
(2012); Linsey M. Ajubita, Note, Regulating the Treatment and Discharge of Ballast Water to
Protect the Economy and Ecology of the United States, 16 LOY. MAR. L.J. 223, 224 (2017).
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mated $250 million.43 Invasive species implicate public health as
well: ballast water can transfer cholera bacteria or pollutants such
as polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), which can be subsequently
consumed by humans.44
As “the primary distributor of aquatic invasive species,” commer-
cial shipping relocates thousands of nonindigenous invasive species
each year via ballast water exchange.45 Although the majority of
organisms do not survive the trip,46 survival rates are increasing;47
the resilient species that do survive can cause severe damage.48 In
addition, although invasive species are less likely to survive in deep
water, the dangers of deep water ballast water exchange limit
vessels to shallower waters or ports, where non-indigenous invasive
species are more likely to survive.49 Further, researchers have found
that invasive species’ presence, and therefore the probability of sig-
nificant harm, in coastal ecosystems increases as shipping volume
increases.50
Perhaps one of the most troublesome aspects of aquatic invasive
species invasions is the irrevocableness of the invasion itself.
Indeed, “[i]t is a basic fact that established aquatic nonindigenous
species are permanent arrivals.”51 Remedial measures rarely result
in complete eradication.52 As such, preventing aquatic invasive
43. Viktoras Didžiulis, NOBANIS—Invasive Alien Species Fact Sheet: Mnemiopsis leidyi,
EUR. NETWORK ON INVASIVE ALIEN SPECIES (2013), https://www.nobanis.org/globalassets/
speciesinfo/m/mnemiopsis-leidyi/mnemiopsis_leidyi.pdf [https://perma.cc/USS7-WY4X].
44. ANS TASK FORCE, supra note 40; see Benson et al., supra note 1.
45. Bostrom, supra note 25, at 871-72.
46. Ajubita, supra note 42, at 225.
47. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, AQUATIC NUISANCE SPECIES IN BALLAST WATER DIS-
CHARGES: ISSUES AND OPTIONS 4 (2001), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-09/
documents/ballast14h.pdf [https://perma.cc/9PL3-U6S3] (draft report for public comment); see
also ROLIM, supra note 36, at 19 (describing factors contributing to an increase in invasive
species introductions).
48. See Bostrom, supra note 25, at 872; Hull, supra note 42, at 54-55.
49. See BYERS WITH BAKER, supra note 30, at 189; see also TAN, supra note 15, at 170.
50. John M. Drake & David M. Lodge, Global Hot Spots of Biological Invasions: Eval-
uating Options for Ballast-Water Management, 271 PROC. ROYAL SOC’Y LONDON B 575, 575,
578 (2004); see also Arthur J. Niimi, Environmental Assessment: Environmental and Economic
Factors Can Increase the Risk of Exotic Species Introductions to the Arctic Region Through
Increased Ballast Water Discharge, 33 ENVTL. MGMT. 712, 713 (2004) (“[E]xotic species ...
introductions have commonly been associated with human activities.” (citation omitted)).
51. ROLIM, supra note 36, at 19.
52. Id. at 19-20.
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species from reaching foreign ports via ballast water is effectively
“the only solution.”53
B. The Ballast Water Management Convention
The International Maritime Organization (IMO), a United Na-
tions agency charged with “the safety and security of shipping and
the prevention of marine pollution by ships,”54 adopted the BWMC
in 2004.55 The BWMC entered into force on September 8, 2017, one
year after reaching its threshold for ratification.56 To enter into
force, the BWMC required “ratification by a minimum of 30 States,
representing 35 percent of world merchant shipping tonnage.”57
Although the treaty easily passed the thirty-country minimum by
2016, Finland’s entry as the fifty-second contracting nation raised
the shipping tonnage above the 35 percent threshold.58 Between
2004 and 2017, guidelines for the BWMC’s implementation were de-
veloped as ballast water treatment technology progressed, causing
more countries to join.59 As of August 6, 2018, the BWMC had
seventy-six “Contracting States,” representing 77.08 percent of
world merchant shipping tonnage.60 
53. Id. at 19; see also Hull, supra note 42, at 57 (“[T]he most effective strategy to address
species invasion is to identify and close critical pathways through which species are initially
introduced.”).
54. Introduction to IMO, INT’L MAR. ORG., http://www.imo.org/en/About/Pages/Default.
aspx [https://perma.cc/EEB3-QFES].
55. International Convention for the Control and Management of Ships' Ballast Water and
Sediments (BWM), INT ’L MAR. ORG., http://www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/ListOf
Conventions/Pages/International-Convention-for-the-Control-and-Management-of-Ships'-
Ballast-Water-and-Sediments-(BWM).aspx [https://perma.cc/Z3HV-637G].
56. Global Treaty to Halt Invasive Aquatic Species Enters into Force, INT’L MAR. ORG.,
(Sept. 8, 2017) http://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/PressBriefings/Pages/21-BWM-EIF.aspx
[https://perma.cc/Z3AX-RLF3]; see also Ballast Water Convention to Enter into Force in 2017,
MAR. EXECUTIVE (Sept. 9, 2016), https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/ballast-water-
convention-to-enter-into-force-in-2017 [https://perma.cc/3VGA-MEW9]. For a brief overview
of the IMO’s convention adoption and entry into force processes, see ROLIM, supra note 36, at
78-79.
57. MAR. EXECUTIVE, supra note 56.
58. Id.
59. See Ballast Water Management, INT ’L MAR. ORG., http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/
Environment/BallastWaterManagement/Pages/Default.aspx [https://perma.cc/44JY-F5LL].
60. INT ’L MAR. ORG., STATUS OF IMO TREATIES 515-16 (2018), http://www.imo.org/en/
About/Conventions/StatusOfConventions/Documents/Status%20-%202018.pdf [https://perma.
cc/4QRW-QSFL].
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A binding, multilateral international convention, the BWMC
seeks “to prevent, minimize[,] and ultimately eliminate the risks to
the environment, human health, property[,] and resources arising
from the transfer of Harmful Aquatic Organisms and Pathogens
through the control and management of ships’ Ballast Water and
Sediments.”61 To achieve this end, BWMC parties agree to myriad
obligations regarding ballast water exchange, treatment, and man-
agement procedures, including: data collection, monitoring, report-
ing, compliance inspections, and enforcement.62 Parties must further
“ensure that Ballast Water Management practices used to comply
with this Convention do not cause greater harm than they prevent
to their environment, human health, property or resources, or those
of other States.”63 The BWMC dictates that “[e]ach Party shall, with
due regard to its particular conditions and capabilities, develop
national policies, strategies or programmes for Ballast Water Man-
agement in its ports and waters under its jurisdiction that accord
with, and promote the attainment of the objectives of this Conven-
tion.”64 A related and noteworthy, yet sometimes exercised,65 pro-
vision grants BWMC parties the ability to institute stricter
standards:
Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as preventing a
Party from taking, individually or jointly with other Parties,
more stringent measures with respect to the prevention,
reduction or elimination of the transfer of Harmful Aquatic
Organisms and Pathogens through the control and management
of ships’ Ballast Water and Sediments, consistent with inter-
national law.66
61. BWMC, supra note 19, annex at 2. The BWMC further seeks “to avoid unwanted side-
effects from that control.” Id.
62. See Jeremy Firestone & James J. Corbett, Coastal and Port Environments: Interna-
tional Legal and Policy Responses to Reduce Ballast Water Introductions of Potentially
Invasive Species, 7 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL'Y 45, 45-47 (2006).
63. BWMC, supra note 19, art. 2, ¶ 7. For the definition of “Ballast Water Management,”
see id. art. 1, ¶ 3.
64. BWMC, supra note 19, art. 4, ¶ 2.
65. See Firestone & Corbett, supra note 62, at 47, 83 n.52.
66. BWMC, supra note 19, art. 2, ¶ 3.
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BWMC Article 12 addresses the undue detention or delay of
ships: “All possible efforts shall be made to avoid a ship being
unduly detained or delayed under Article 7.2, 8, 9[,] or 10.”67 In
addition to Article 12’s broad coverage, Article 9 itself reiterates the
concern over “port state[s]”68 unduly delaying or detaining ships
during compliance inspections.69 Specifically, in the context of bal-
last water sampling, Article 9 states that “the time required to an-
alyse the samples shall not be used as a basis for unduly delaying
the operation, movement[,] or departure of the ship.”70
Article 10 covers contingencies in the event a violation of the
BWMC occurs.71 Should a violation be found, either the “flag state”72
or port state may conduct an Article 9 inspection, or otherwise
“warn, detain, or exclude the ship.”73 The port state may also allow
the ship in question to leave port to release its ballast water,
“provided doing so does not present a threat of harm to the environ-
ment, human health, property[,] or resources.”74 If an Article 9,
paragraph 1(c) ballast water sampling test shows that the ship
“poses a threat to the environment, human health, property[,] or
resources,” the port state “shall prohibit such ship from discharging
Ballast Water until the threat is removed.”75 Article 10’s provisions
are, of course, subject to Article 12’s prohibition against undue
detention and delay.76
Thus, the BWMC prohibits undue detention and delay, and pro-
vides for compensation for any damage or loss sustained by an
“unduly detained or delayed” ship.77 Yet, importantly, the BWMC
67. Id. art. 12, ¶ 1. Article 7 and 8 undue delay and detention lies beyond this Note’s
scope. See supra note 21.
68. A “port state” is the nation “whose ports and internal waters a vessel sails into.” TAN,
supra note 15, at 23. The BWMC refers to port states using language such as “the Party in
whose port or offshore terminal the ship is operating.” E.g., BWMC, supra note 19, art. 10,
¶ 2.
69. See BWMC, supra note 19, art. 9, ¶ 1(c).
70. Id. 
71. See id. art. 10, ¶ 2.
72. A “flag state” is the nation “with whom a vessel is registered or whose flag the vessel
flies.” TAN, supra note 15, at 23. The BWMC refers to flag states using such language as “the
Party whose flag the ship is entitled to fly.” E.g., BWMC, supra note 19, art. 10, ¶ 2.
73. BWMC, supra note 19, art. 10, ¶ 2.
74. Id.
75. Id. art. 10, ¶ 3.
76. Id. art. 12, ¶ 1.
77. Id. art. 12.
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lacks a formal definition, or any guidance for that matter, as to
what would make a detention or delay “undue.” This gap—and the
internal tension it creates—has not gone unnoticed: “Although it is
unclear what the scope of the undue delay requirement is, the pro-
vision has the potential to undermine the port state's ability to
board the vessel and enforce the provisions of the Convention.”78
Indeed, the undue detention and delay provision “stands in contra-
distinction to the general obligation standard, which mandates that
‘the practices used ... do not cause greater harm than they present
to their environment, human health, property or resources[,] or
those of other states.’”79 In the ballast water sampling context,80
“ballast tank sample analysis requires varying amounts of time
depending upon the number of ships and the local testing facility
capacity.”81 Port states with nascent infrastructure may cause
undue delay through no fault other than the realities of being a
developing country.82
These criticisms demonstrate the sharpness of the BWMC’s dou-
ble-edged sword. A party must endeavor to meet the BWMC’s objec-
tives without unduly detaining or delaying a vessel.83 However, the
vagueness of “undue” and differences in capabilities may undermine
a party’s ability to achieve the BWMC’s objectives.84 At the same
time, a party fearful of “undue” delay that does not hold a ship long
enough risks the release of invasive species in contravention of that
party’s obligations under Article 2, paragraphs 6 and 7, among
others.85
78. Bostrom, supra note 25, at 891.
79. Tony George Puthucherril, Ballast Waters and Aquatic Invasive Species: A Model For
India, 19 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 381, 404 (2008) (quoting BWMC, supra note 19,
art. 2, ¶ 7).
80. See BWMC, supra note 19, art. 9, ¶ 1(c).
81. Puthucherril, supra note 79, at 403.
82. See id. at 403-04. Puthucherril proposed that the BWMC should have mandated that
BWMC parties assist developing member countries erect infrastructure such as testing fa-
cilities to remedy this problem. Id. at 404.
83. BWMC, supra note 19, art. 12.
84. See supra text accompanying notes 78-82.
85. “Parties taking action pursuant to this Convention shall endeavour not to impair or
damage their environment, human health, property or resources, or those of other States.”
BWMC, supra note 19, art. 2, ¶ 6. For the text to Article 2, paragraph 7, see supra text accom-
panying note 63.
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To eliminate this tension—or to at least begin on that path—
Parts II and III argue that the BWMC’s undue detention and delay
provisions regarding compliance inspections can and should be read
to contemplate a geography-dependent standard. That is, when de-
termining whether a ship’s delay or detention was “undue,” the lo-
cation of the compliance inspection can and should be factored into
the calculus.
II. THE BWMC’S UNDUE DETENTION AND DELAY PROVISIONS
CAN BE READ TO CONSIDER WHERE THE COMPLIANCE
INSPECTION OCCURRED
As environmental and natural resources attorney Suzanne
Bostrom highlighted, the BWMC fails to delineate the scope of its
undue detention and delay requirements.86 Given this lack of
definition or guidance, the proposition that this scope can include a
geographic consideration must find support elsewhere. Indeed, it
would be easy to claim that virtually anything could be within the
scope of “undue,” but such claims must be grounded in and consis-
tent with the BWMC. Looking at the BWMC’s text reveals support
for the geographic consideration.87
This Note will analyze the BWMC using the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). The VCLT’s rules of interpretation
are commonly applied to myriad international agreements, includ-
ing conventions.88 VCLT Article 31, paragraph 1 states: “A treaty
shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and
in the light of its object and purpose.”89 Article 31, paragraph 2
defines the context referred to in paragraph 1 to include the treaty’s
text, which includes the preamble and annexes.90 The balance of
Article 31, paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 (when applicable) broaden
86. See Bostrom, supra note 25, at 891.
87. See infra Parts II.A-B.
88. For an explanation regarding the VCLT’s applicability to international instruments,
see RICHARD K. GARDINER, TREATY INTERPRETATION 20-21 (2d ed. 2015). As a convention, the
BWMC is a “treaty” for VCLT interpretive purposes. See id. at 21.
89. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, ¶ 1, opened for signature May 23,
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter VCLT].
90. Id. art. 31, ¶ 2.
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“context” beyond mere text.91 Should the full application of Article
31 ultimately lead to an “ambiguous or obscure,” or “manifestly
absurd or unreasonable” result, the interpreter may also refer to
“supplementary means of interpretation” such as the treaty’s “prep-
aratory work.”92 Preparatory work, or travaux préparatoires in
French, includes, among other things, treaty drafts, conference
minutes, and memoranda.93 Although a full interpretation of the
BWMC’s undue detention and delay provisions would venture
beyond the BWMC’s “four corners,” the analysis here is limited to
the BWMC’s text. To show that further interpretive analysis would
be worthwhile, this Note focuses on demonstrating that the BWMC’s
text supports a geography-dependent undue delay and detention
standard.
Part II.A uses the VCLT to elucidate the meaning of “undue” as
it is used in the BWMC. Part II.B uses the VCLT to demonstrate
that a geography-dependent standard can be included within the
meaning of “undue” as it is used in the BWMC.
A. Ordinary Meaning of an Individual Term
Finding the meaning of “undue” as it is used in the BWMC begins
with establishing its ordinary meaning. The ordinary meaning of a
term serves as a reasonable starting point for interpretation of that
term as it is used in the subject treaty.94 A term’s dictionary def-
inition can be the term’s ordinary meaning.95 To see if the dictionary
definition can be accepted as the ordinary meaning, the interpreter
must check the dictionary definition in the treaty’s context.96 Should
the dictionary definition make sense in context, the interpreter’s job
of establishing the ordinary meaning is essentially complete, and
the interpretation may continue.97 However, the interpreter must
abandon the dictionary definition as a reasonable starting point if
91. See id. art. 31, ¶¶ 2-4.
92. Id. art. 32.
93. GARDINER, supra note 88, at 25.
94. See id. at 27, 181.
95. See id. at 184-86.
96. See id. at 185.
97. See id.; see also Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v. Sen.), Judgment,
1991 I.C.J. Rep. 53, ¶ 48 (Nov. 12) (citations omitted).
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the application of that definition in context leads to an unreasonable
result.98
Here, the treaty term in question is “unduly.”99 One may notice
the absence of analysis regarding “detain” and “delay.” For the sake
of brevity, and because any real-world dispute would likely center
on the more problematic question of whether a delay or detention
was “undue,”100 this Note focuses on the meaning of “unduly.”101
1. Aggregate Ordinary Meaning
Subject to the potential criticism that one word may have more
than one meaning,102 this analysis uses several dictionaries to “con-
vey some of the essence of [the] term” and establish an aggregate
ordinary meaning.103 Thus, an extra step is added in the task of es-
tablishing the ordinary meaning of “undue.” In this Part, a singular
definition will be distilled from multiple dictionary definitions. This
singular definition will then be tested in context to see if it can be
the ordinary meaning of “undue.”104
98. See GARDINER, supra note 88, at 185; see also Arbital Award, 1991 I.C.J. Rep. ¶ 48
(citations omitted).
99. BWMC, supra note 19, art. 12, ¶ 1. Regarding variations in grammatical formulation,
see supra note 26.
100. Cf. Angelex Ltd. v. United States, 272 F. Supp. 3d 64, 73-74 (D.D.C. 2017) (analyzing
a statute prohibiting the U.S. Coast Guard from “unreasonably” delaying a vessel).
101. This assumption does not detract from the overall thrust of the argument present-
ed here. Indeed, if one were to run the same analysis for “delay” and “detain” as “undue,” one
would readily see that the ordinary meanings of “delay” and “detain” fit neatly into the
BWMC. See infra text accompanying notes 105-20.
102. See Georg Schwarzenberger, Myths and Realities of Treaty Interpretation: Articles 27-
29 of the Vienna Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties, 9 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 13 (1968). But
see Aguas del Tunari S.A. v. Bol., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3, Decision on Respondent’s
Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 91 n.51 (Oct. 21, 2005) (“From the standpoint of language, one
meaning does not have preference over another. Any meaning which is possible in a semantic
sense is also permissible semantically. It would be a mistake to base a doctrine of legal
interpretation on dictates, as it were, of linguistics.” (quoting AHARON BARAK, JUDICIAL
DISCRETION 341-42 (1987))).
103. Appellate Body Report, Canada—Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft,
¶ 153, WTO Doc. WT/DS70/AB/R (adopted Aug. 2, 1999). The Appellate Body utilized multiple
dictionaries in its interpretation of “benefit” in the context of the Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures. See id. ¶¶ 153-54.
104. See infra Part II.A.2.
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The dictionary meaning of “unduly” is: (1) “improperly; unjustly”
or “to an undue degree; excessively”;105 (2) “immoderately; ex-
cessively” or “in contradiction of moral or legal standards”;106 or
(3) “unwarranted or inappropriate because excessive or dispropor-
tionate.”107 Aggregating these definitions and then distilling the
aggregate’s common features renders the “essence” of “unduly.”108
This “essence” comprehends an excessiveness, an inordinate amount
as measured against a given standard;109 notions of justice and
morality, or lack thereof, also inhere in “unduly.”110 This distilled
“essence”—excessively, inordinately, or unjustly—reflects a general,
ordinary meaning of the word “unduly.”111
2. Applying the Ordinary Meaning in Context
The crucial next step in the interpretation analysis calls for a
check on the subject term’s ordinary meaning.112 The BWMC’s text,
including the preamble and annexes, provides the context for this
check.113 Should the ordinary meaning of “unduly,” as applied in the
BWMC’s context, render the relevant provisions absurd, unreason-
able, or illogical, that ordinary meaning must fail and the analysis
look elsewhere.114
Article 31 “context” comprehends a treaty’s entire text; the in-
terpreter begins with words immediately adjacent to the subject
term, and then considers “more remote elements such as compari-
sons with other provisions on similar matters or using similar
105. Unduly, WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY (4th ed. 2009).
106. Unduly, COLLINS ENGLISH DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2014).
107. Undue, THE NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY (2d ed. 2005).
108. Cf. Canada—Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, supra note 103, ¶¶
153-54.
109. See supra text accompanying notes 105-07.
110. See supra text accompanying notes 105-06.
111. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
112. See GARDINER, supra note 88, at 185.
113. See VCLT, supra note 89, art. 31, ¶ 2.
114. See GARDINER, supra note 88, at 185. An extreme example illustrates the point: In
addition to a general confinement, a “detention” may also be the specific punishment of being
kept at school after hours. See, e.g., Detention, WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY
(4th ed. 2009). A port state should not unduly keep a student after hours. Laudable as this
policy may be, it is very likely not what the IMO intended “detention” to mean in the context
of the BWMC. See generally BWMC, supra note 19, annex at 1-2.
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wording.”115 As the interpreter widens the context, the analysis nat-
urally gravitates toward the third element of Article 31, paragraph
1: the treaty’s object and purpose.116
BWMC Article 9, paragraph 1(c) states that “the time required to
analyse [ballast water] samples shall not be used as a basis for
unduly delaying the operation, movement[,] or departure of the
ship.”117 Here, inserting the distilled ordinary meaning of “unduly”
renders a coherent result that makes sense in the immediate con-
text of the provision. Indeed, the provision may be rewritten for this
exercise as follows: “the time required to analyse [ballast water]
samples shall not be used as a basis for [excessively, inordinately,
or unjustly] delaying the operation, movement or departure of the
ship.”118 Article 12, which applies to the actions taken by port or flag
states in Articles 9 and 10, states that “[a]ll possible efforts shall be
made to avoid a ship being unduly detained or delayed.”119 Again,
substituting the distilled ordinary meaning of “unduly” into the
immediate context of the provision leads to a reasonable, logical
result: “All possible efforts shall be made to avoid a ship being
[excessively, inordinately, or unjustly] detained or delayed.”120
3. Grappling with the Ambiguity of “Undue”
Although the distilled ordinary meaning of “undue” fits well in
context,121 a lack of full meaning plagues “undue.” By definition,
something can be “undue” only as measured against a standard or
norm.122 “Unduly” may mean excessively, inordinately, or unjustly,
but all of these words depend on something more for their full
meaning.123 Put another way, if “unduly” may be described as “more
115. See GARDINER, supra note 88, at 197.
116. See id. 
117. BWMC, supra note 19, art. 9, ¶ 1(c).
118. Id.
119. Id. art. 12, ¶ 1.
120. Id.
121. See supra Part II.A.2.
122. See supra text accompanying notes 105-11.
123. Cf. Angelex Ltd. v. United States, 272 F. Supp. 3d 64, 74 (D.D.C. 2017) (“While it is
certainly beyond argument that words found in statutes should be interpreted using their
ordinary, contemporary, common meaning ... the definition of the word ‘unreasonable’ hardly
sheds light on what it means to be unreasonable in a given case.” (citation omitted)). 
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than was called for,”124 then the interpreter must know what was
originally called for to know what is more, and therefore what is
“undue.” As one U.S. court stated when considering the Bureau of
Land Management’s statutory responsibility to “take any action
necessary to prevent unnecessary or undue degradation of the
lands,”125 “[a]pplication of this standard is necessarily context-
specific; the words ‘unnecessary’ and ‘undue’ are modifiers requiring
nouns to give them meaning, and by the plain terms of the statute,
that noun in each case must be whatever actions are causing
‘degradation.’”126 Lastly, absent any narrowing language, the in-
herent subjectivity and ambiguity of “undue” can impede effective
enforcement of the provision in question.127
“Undue” is inherently ambiguous, and this ambiguity raises a
host of problems for the BWMC. Yet, the analysis has reached a
point at which explication of what is written in the BWMC has
served its useful purpose. Therefore, to further develop the scope of
“undue” and ameliorate these problems, this Note will transition
from interpreting what is already present in the BWMC to inserting
a new provision and testing to see if it can stay.128 This relates back
to part of this Note’s principal argument, that the standard for what
constitutes “undue” can take into account the location of the
compliance inspection.129 Part II.B will use the VCLT to test this
assertion,130 predicated on the following logic: if the VCLT directs an
interpreter to dismiss a potential meaning of a word or phrase when
that meaning, in context and held up to the treaty’s object and
purpose, leads to an unreasonable or illogical result,131 then an
interpreter may retain a potential meaning if, in context and held
up to the treaty’s object and purpose, that meaning does not lead to
an unreasonable or illogical result.
124. A fair description based on its ordinary meaning. See supra text accompanying note
111.
125. Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b) (2012).
126. Theodore Roosevelt Conservation P’ship v. Salazar, 661 F.3d 66, 76 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
127. See infra Part III.A.
128. See infra Part II.B.
129. See supra text accompanying note 27.
130. See VCLT, supra note 89, art. 31, ¶¶ 1-2.
131. See Arbital Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v. Sen.), Judgment, 1991 I.C.J. Rep.
53, ¶ 48 (Nov. 12) (citations omitted); GARDINER, supra note 88, at 185.
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B. Testing the Geographic Consideration
Having outlined the VCLT’s analytical framework, developed an
ordinary meaning of “undue,” and addressed the limitations of that
ordinary meaning, this Note turns to testing whether a geographic
factor can be read into the undue detention and delay provisions.
Put another way, would the following hypothetical (or similar)
language be reasonable and logical: while conducting ballast water
sampling, no flag or port state shall unduly delay or detain the
subject vessel; determining whether a delay or detention was “un-
due” shall include consideration of the ballast water sampling’s
geographic location. The following analysis, which tests the geo-
graphic factor language in context and then in light of the BWMC’s
object and purpose, demonstrates this language’s reasonableness
and logic.
1. In Context, Immediate and Distant
In the immediate context of Articles 9 and 12,132 the geographic
factor language does not cause an unreasonable result. Inserted in-
to Article 9, paragraph 1(c), the factor would create a reading as
follows: “[T]he time required to analyse the samples shall not be
used as a basis for unduly delaying the operation, movement or
departure of the ship[; determining whether a delay was “undue”
shall include consideration of the ballast water sampling’s geo-
graphic location].”133
One can also envision inserting the geographic factor in Article
12, paragraphs 1 and 2.134 “All possible efforts shall be made to
avoid a ship being unduly detained or delayed under Article 7.2, 8,
9[,] or 10[; determining whether a delay or detention was “undue”
shall include consideration of the ballast water sampling’s geo-
graphic location].”135 “When a ship is unduly detained or delayed
under Article 7.2, 8, 9[,] or 10, it shall be entitled to compensation
132. Recall that Article 12’s undue delay and detention proscription applies to Article 10
and, unlike Article 9, Article 10 does not have its own undue delay or detention provision. See
BWMC, supra note 19, arts. 9, 10, 12, ¶ 1.
133. Id. art. 9, ¶ 1(c).
134. See id. art. 12, ¶¶ 1-2.
135. Id. art. 12, ¶ 1.
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for any loss or damage suffered[; determining whether a delay or
detention was “undue” shall include consideration of the ballast
water sampling’s geographic location].”136 Although the interpreter
may argue that these readings do not appear absurd, unreasonable,
or illogical, at this point the interpreter would be hard-pressed to
argue persuasively that these readings are altogether reasonable,
logical, and consistent with the BWMC without doing more.
On paper, the next VCLT step would be to consider more distant
context.137 However, the analysis arguably has already considered
more distant context because it has already tested the geographic
consideration in BWMC Articles 9 and 12, which address similar
matters and use nearly identical wording.138 In both provisions, the
geographic factor does not seem unreasonable, but the need for af-
firmative confirmation remains. Therefore, the analysis moves to
the last element of VCLT Article 31(1): the treaty’s object and pur-
pose.139
2. In Light of the BWMC’s Object and Purpose
A treaty’s preamble serves as the starting point for establishing
the treaty’s object and purpose.140 However, the interpreter “needs
to read the whole treaty,” as the “substantive provisions will provide
the fuller indication of the object and purpose.”141 Though the mi-
nority view, this Note adopts the French public law approach of
treating “object” and “purpose” as two distinct, yet related, ele-
ments.142 The purpose is simply “the general result which the
136. Id. art. 12, ¶ 2.
137. See GARDINER, supra note 88, at 197.
138. See id. (defining distant context as including “elements such as comparisons with
other provisions on similar matters or using similar wording”). Compare BWMC, supra note
19, art. 9, ¶ 1(c), with id. art. 12, ¶ 1.
139. See GARDINER, supra note 88, at 197.
140. See id. at 216-17.
141. Id. at 218.
142. See id. at 213 (citing Isabelle Buffard & Karl Zemanek, The “Object and Purpose” of
a Treaty: An Enigma?, 3 AUSTRIAN REV. INT’L & EUR. L. 311, 325-28 (1998)). For Gardiner’s
rationale as to why this approach is “appropriate,” see id. For additional explanation of the
majority approach that treats “object and purpose” as a single unit, see Isabelle Buffard &
Karl Zemanek, The “Object and Purpose” of a Treaty: An Enigma?, 3 AUSTRIAN REV. INT’L &
EUR. L. 311, 322-25 (1998). I note that he adopts the French approach as it seems logical.
Elucidating the BWMC’s object and purpose will necessarily involve looking at the preamble
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parties want to achieve by the treaty.”143 “The object of a treaty is
the instrument for the achievement of the treaty’s purpose,” which
“can be found in the provisions of the treaty.”144 This Note will look
at the BWMC’s preamble and several substantive provisions to
elucidate the BWMC’s object and purpose, and then argue that in-
clusion of the geographic consideration is reasonable in light of that
object and purpose.
In the BWMC’s preamble, the parties resolve “to prevent,
minimize and ultimately eliminate the risks to the environment,
human health, property[,] and resources arising from the transfer
of Harmful Aquatic Organisms and Pathogens through the control
and management of ships’ Ballast Water and Sediments.”145 It
stands to reason that this is the BWMC’s purpose: “the general
result which the parties want to achieve.”146 To achieve this purpose,
the parties then agree to the substantive provisions that follow the
preamble.147 These substantive provisions are the BWMC’s object.148
Preceding the BWMC’s purpose is an important paragraph that
acknowledges previous state-based aquatic invasive species
mitigation efforts, but also recognizes “that this issue, being of
worldwide concern, demands action based on globally applicable
regulations together with guidelines for their effective implemen-
tation and uniform interpretation.”149 One may argue that this
language precludes, as a matter of the BWMC’s purpose, geography-
dependent standards. However, such a reading is illogical and
inconsistent with the BWMC. That the paragraph requires a “glob-
ally applicable” regulatory scheme150 does not necessarily mean that
the regulations themselves must be geographically inflexible.
and substantive provisions—the former containing language regarding purpose but no
substantive obligations, the latter containing substantive obligations engineered to achieve
that which is set out in the preamble. See infra text accompanying notes 145-64. In the end,
the same provisions will be analyzed no matter which conceptual approach I adopt. All else
being equal, as constructed, the BWMC seems fit for the French approach and the French
approach for the BWMC.
143. GARDINER, supra note 88, at 213 (quoting Buffard & Zemanek, supra note 142, at 326).
144. Id. (quoting Buffard & Zemanek, supra note 142, at 326).
145. BWMC, supra note 19, annex at 2.
146. GARDINER, supra note 88, at 213.
147. See BWMC, supra note 19, annex at 2.
148. See supra text accompanying note 146.
149. BWMC, supra note 19, annex at 1.
150. Id.
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Indeed, it reasons that, depending on the thing being regulated, a
truly “globally applicable” regulation would have to recognize the
many differences found across the globe.151 In sum, this paragraph
is not precluding geography-dependent standards. Rather, this
paragraph calls for a centralized system of standards that can be
applied across the globe, whatever those standards may contain, to
advance the BWMC’s purpose.
With the BWMC’s purpose in hand, the analysis next examines
the BWMC’s object, its substantive provisions.152 Articles 9 and 12
create obligations for the parties to not unduly delay or detain a
vessel while fulfilling other BWMC obligations, namely compliance
inspections.153 Other BWMC provisions support the proposition that
the BWMC will fail in its purpose unless the standard used to
determine the undue-ness of a delay or detention under Articles 9
or 12 takes the location of the inspection into account.154 Further,
certain other BWMC provisions have express or implied geography-
dependent elements.155 Thus, recognizing a geography-dependent
undue delay and detention standard would not be inconsistent with
the BWMC’s object or purpose. 
BWMC Article 2, paragraph 3 provides that the parties are not
precluded from taking “more stringent measures” to advance the
BWMC’s purpose.156 If, when assessing the undue-ness of a delay or
detention, the BWMC was incapable of taking into account the
compliance inspection location, then Article 2, paragraph 3 would be
an empty grant of power. A short hypothetical demonstrates this
point. Port state A and port state B are BWMC parties, each subject
to a fixed, geography-independent undue delay and detention
standard for compliance inspections. For simplicity, assume that the
standard considers a delay of more than twenty-four hours “undue.”
Port state B uses its Article 2, paragraph 3 power to establish a
ballast water tank sampling test that is more rigorous than the
BWMC’s default test. The results of this test are available no earlier
151. The BWMC expressly recognizes this in at least one of its substantive provisions, as
do other bodies of international law. See infra note 163 and accompanying text.
152. See supra text accompanying note 144.
153. See BWMC, supra note 19, arts. 9, ¶ 1(c), 12, ¶ 1.
154. See infra text accompanying notes 156-61.
155. See infra text accompanying notes 162-65.
156. BWMC, supra note 19, art. 2, ¶ 3.
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than thirty-six hours post-test. Port state B holds a ship in port and
runs the test. By mere operation of its test, port state B has unduly
delayed the ship.157 In contrast, an undue delay standard that takes
into account port state B’s more rigorous test would not, at least by
default, undermine Article 2, paragraph 3.
Article 2, paragraphs 6 and 7 present a similar issue to Article 2,
paragraph 3. Under Article 2, paragraph 6, “[p]arties taking action
pursuant to [the BWMC] shall endeavour not to impair or damage
their environment, human health, property or resources, or those of
other States.”158 Under Article 2, paragraph 7, “[p]arties should
ensure that Ballast Water Management practices used to comply
with [the BWMC] do not cause greater harm than they prevent to
their environment, human health, property or resources, or those of
other States.”159 If the undue detention and delay standard is the
same for every member port state, then some port states may find
themselves in an inescapable predicament.160 Marine and environ-
mental law scholar Tony George Puthucherril identified this issue
in the context of Article 2, paragraph 7, specifically with respect to
ballast water sampling in port states with developing infrastruc-
ture.161 Port states with particularly delicate ecosystems and unique
geographies, such as Artic coastal states and Australia, may be sim-
ilarly disadvantaged because their environments necessarily require
more effort to protect from aquatic invasive species invasion.162 A
geography-independent undue delay and detention standard would
ignore these differences, adversely impacting port states that must
take extra efforts to comply with Article 2, paragraphs 6 and 7.
Moving on from the obligations in Article 2, the BWMC already
contains geography-dependent provisions. For one, BWMC Regu-
lation C-1 provides that BWMC parties may implement special
157. Cf. Bostrom, supra note 25, at 891 (“[T]he undue delay requirement ... has the
potential to undermine the port state's ability to board the vessel and enforce the provisions
of the Convention.”)
158. BWMC, supra note 19, art. 2, ¶ 6.
159. Id. art. 2, ¶ 7.
160. See TAN, supra note 15, at 169; Simpson-Wood, supra note 8, at 1252-53.
161. See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
162. See TAN, supra note 15, at 169-70; Pamel & Wilkins, supra note 9, at 341 (citing R.
Douglas Brubaker, Regulation of Navigation and Vessel-Source Pollution in the Northern Sea
Route: Article 234 and State Practice, in PROTECTING THE POLAR MARINE ENVIRONMENT: LAW
AND POLICY FOR POLLUTION PREVENTION 221-43 (Davor Vidas ed., 2000)); Simpson-Wood,
supra note 8, at 1252-53.
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requirements in areas needing more invasive species protection
than the BWMC baseline can provide.163 Further, under Article 4,
paragraph 2, “Each Party shall, with due regard to its particular
conditions and capabilities, develop national policies, strategies or
programmes for Ballast Water Management in its ports and waters
under its jurisdiction that accord with, and promote the attainment
of the objectives of this Convention.”164 Given that these provisions
were adopted to achieve the BWMC’s purpose,165 it can be said that
provisions containing geography-dependent elements can and do
advance the BWMC’s purpose. It would therefore be consistent with
the BWMC’s provisions (its object) and purpose to also include a
geography-dependent undue delay and detention standard.
Between the general obligations and specific examples of geo-
graphy-dependent language, these provisions demonstrate that if
the scope of the standard for what constitutes “undue” does not take
the location of the compliance inspection into account, the BWMC
would stand at great risk of failing to achieve its stated purpose. In
contrast, a geography-dependent standard would be consistent,
reasonable, and logical in light of the BWMC’s object and purpose. 
Concluding Part II, the ordinary meaning of “unduly” fits in the
context of the BWMC. Recognizing, however, the inherent ambigu-
ity of “unduly,” room exists to shape and refine what “unduly” could
comprehend as used in the BWMC.166 As applied in context and in
light of the BWMC’s object and purpose, the standard for what
constitutes “undue” with respect to compliance inspection delays or
detentions can include consideration of the inspection’s geographic
location.167
163. See BWMC, supra note 19, annex at 20. Recognition of “special areas” is not uncom-
mon. See Special Areas Under MARPOL, INT’L MAR. ORG., http://www.imo.org/en/Our
Work/Environment/SpecialAreasUnderMARPOL/Pages/Default.aspx [https://perma.cc/Y85K-
WBY9] (noting that the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
recognizes “special areas [that] are provided with a higher level of protection than other areas
of the sea”).
164. BWMC, supra note 19, art. 4, ¶ 2 (emphasis added).
165. See id.
166. See supra Part II.A.3.
167. See supra Part II.B.
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III. THE BWMC’S UNDUE DETENTION AND DELAY PROVISIONS
SHOULD BE READ TO CONSIDER WHERE THE COMPLIANCE
INSPECTION OCCURRED
Recall Suzanne Bostrom’s observation: “Although it is unclear
what the scope of the undue delay requirement is, the provision has
the potential to undermine the port state's ability to board the
vessel and enforce the provisions of the Convention.”168 Including
inspection location in the “undue” calculus would obviate, or at least
begin to obviate, this conflict in a manner that is reasonable and
consistent with the BWMC as a whole.169 That is, the BWMC’s un-
due delay and detention provisions can be read to consider where
the compliance inspection occurred.170 This Part briefly lays out
why, in light of this ability, the BWMC should be read this way.
“Should” can be taken in two ways. Generally, “undue” should be
developed and refined to avoid self-defeat and to incentivize compli-
ance.171 Specifically, the geography-dependent standard should be
used because it reflects the realities that BWMC parties face in
complying with the BWMC.172
A. Refining the Scope of “Undue” Will Avoid Self-Defeat and
Incentivize BWMC Compliance
The problem of vague, subjective modifiers such as “undue” is not
one unique to the BWMC. Indeed, the BWMC’s older, broader cous-
in, the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution
from Ships (MARPOL), shares nearly identical undue delay and
detention language with the BWMC.173 The difficulties caused by
such language have not escaped the academy’s notice:
168. See Bostrom, supra note 25, at 891.
169. See supra Part II.B.
170. See supra Part II.
171. See infra Part III.A.
172. See infra Part III.B.
173. See International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships art. 7, opened
for signature Nov. 2, 1973, 1340 U.N.T.S. 184 (entered into force Oct. 2, 1983) [hereinafter
MARPOL].
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Parties to [MARPOL] installed this safeguard to protect them-
selves from overzealous enforcers and from countries intention-
ally delaying transport of a competitor's goods. However, this
“safeguard” diminishes a port state's incentive to rigorously at-
tempt to uncover pollution violations. In addition, [MARPOL]
provides no definition of the word “undue.” Such subjective
terms need clarification to ensure uniform understanding be-
tween the flag and port states.174
Without more in the treaty text to define, or at least shape, such a
subjective term, courts are left scratching their heads, and counsel’s
arguments are sometimes as vague and unhelpful as the term it-
self.175
The ambiguity of a subjective term such as “undue” has implica-
tions for treaty compliance. In a study included in their monograph
on the “managerial school” of compliance theory, scholars Abram
Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes found that compliance was
generally the norm amongst parties to international treaties.176
Observing that willful disobedience rarely formed the basis for non-
compliance, Chayes and Chayes attributed instances of noncompli-
ance to certain insufficiencies that made compliance more difficult
for parties that would otherwise have an incentive to comply.177 One
such insufficiency was “ambiguity and indeterminacy of treaty lan-
guage.”178
Given the known concerns regarding the ambiguity of “undue”179
and the observation that ambiguous language may contribute to
174. Rebecca Becker, Note, MARPOL 73/78: An Overview in International Environmental
Enforcement, 10 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 625, 637 (1998); see also Andrew Rakestraw, Note,
Open Oceans and Marine Debris: Solutions for the Ineffective Enforcement of MARPOL Annex
V, 35 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 383, 400 (2012) (“‘[U]ndue delay’ is not defined and
subject to the interpretation of each captain, ... thereby reducing incentives for port states to
conduct thorough inspections for fear of having a claim filed against them.” (footnote
omitted)).
175. See Angelex Ltd. v. United States, 272 F. Supp. 3d 64, 74 (D.D.C. 2017).
176. See, e.g., ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY:
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 3-9 (1995). For a critical
response to Chayes’ “managerial school” of compliance, see generally George W. Downs et al.,
Is the Good News About Compliance Good News About Cooperation? 50 INT'L ORG. 379 (1996).
177. See CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 176, at 10.
178. Id. 
179. See supra notes 174-76 and accompanying text.
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noncompliance,180 absent some refinement, the BWMC is poised for
self-defeat. One may rebut this argument by claiming that the argu-
ment assumes “that states will comply with precise obligations bet-
ter than with those that are more generally stated,”181 and proffer
that this assumption is not always true.182 However, this rebuttal
discusses specific obligations and “generally stated” obligations, not
ambiguous provisions.183 A “generally stated” provision is not nec-
essarily ambiguous.184 States may comply with generally stated
obligations better than specific obligations in some circumstances.185
However, compared to obligations that are clear notwithstanding
their level of specificity, ambiguous obligations create a different
problem altogether.186 Consider a hypothetical provision in the
BWMC that provides for compliance inspections consisting of (1) a
ballast water sample collection, and (2) a review of the ship’s ballast
water exchange log. The provision does not expressly state, among
other things, the order in which to conduct these two elements.
Here, the lack of procedural specificity would likely not impact
compliance.187 In contrast, a provision that prohibits “undue delay
or detention” during an inspection, without saying more about what
constitutes “undue,” creates ambiguity188 that would likely nega-
tively affect compliance.189 Incorporating inspection location into the
“undue” delay or detention analysis will ameliorate some of this
ambiguity in the BWMC.190 This will, in turn, help the BWMC avoid
self-defeat vis-à-vis noncompliance caused by ambiguous language.
180. CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 176, at 10.
181. Edith Brown Weiss, Understanding Compliance with International Environmental
Agreements: The Baker’s Dozen Myths, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 1555, 1572 (1999).
182. See id. at 1573.
183. See id. at 1572-73.
184. See id. at 1573.
185. See id.
186. See CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 176, at 10.
187. Cf. Weiss, supra note 181, at 1573 (citing World Heritage Convention Article 4 as an
example in which “[c]ompliance with the more generally stated obligations does not necessar-
ily suffer because of the wording”).
188. See supra notes 174-76 and accompanying text; see also Bostrom, supra note 25, at
891.
189. See CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 176, at 10.
190. See supra Part II.B.
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B. Incorporating Inspection Location Acknowledges Differences in
States’ Needs and Capabilities
In addition to ambiguous language, Chayes and Chayes observed
that “limitations on the capacity of parties to carry out their un-
dertakings” also contributed to noncompliance with international
treaties.191 In the BWMC context, these limitations can be directly
related to the compliance inspection port’s geographic location.192 In
addition to varied capacities to carry out a compliance inspection
without unduly delaying a ship,193 some states simply face higher
stakes when it comes to potential aquatic nuisance species inva-
sion.194 The Arctic is particularly susceptible to invasive species.195
It reasons that Arctic states would want more leeway in conducting
compliance inspections to protect the fragile Arctic ecosystem. If the
IMO hopes “to prevent, minimize[,] and ultimately eliminate”196
aquatic invasive species invasions, then the IMO should construe
the BWMC as recognizing these varied capacities and elevated risks
in the BWMC’s “undue” delay and detention standard. Thus, if
“unduly” may be described as “more than was called for,” applied to
an inspection in the Arctic the standard for an undue delay should
be “more than was called for in an inspection in the Arctic.”197
Taking geographic location into account would reflect the reality
that circumstances in one geographic location are different than in
another.
One may counter argue that a standard that does not take lo-
cation into account is the proper way to reduce the ambiguity of
“undue” because it is necessary for optimal operation of the BWMC.
After all, it is plausible to think that in allowing for location to
inform what is “undue,” the expectations of flag states and their
191. CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 176, at 10.
192. See, e.g., Puthucherril, supra note 79, at 403.
193. See id.
194. See TAN, supra note 15, at 169-70; Pamel & Wilkins, supra note 9, at 341 (citing
Brubaker, supra note 162, at 221-43); Simpson-Wood, supra note 8, at 1253.
195. See Pamel & Wilkins, supra note 9, at 341 (citing Brubaker, supra note 162, at 221-
43); Simpson-Wood, supra note 8, at 1253.
196. BWMC, supra note 19, annex at 1.
197. Cf. Theodore Roosevelt Conservation P’ship v. Salazar, 661 F.3d 66, 76 (D.C. Cir.
2011) (“[D]efining ‘unnecessary’ in the mining context [would be] ‘that which is not necessary
for mining.’” (citing Utah v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 995, 1005 n.13 (D. Utah 1979))).
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vessels would be frustrated.198 However, a fixed standard would
undermine the BWMC’s purpose and object.199 Further, a fixed
standard would ignore the reality that different states have
different environmental needs and capacities to comply with the
BWMC.200 Lastly, given that vessels transport aquatic invasive
species,201 and the BWMC seeks to eliminate vessel-borne transfer
of said species,202 it reasons that the port states tasked with regu-
lating and inspecting these vessels would win in a weighing-of-the-
interests analysis. Since the geography-dependent standard is in
the port states’ best interest, which in turn is in the BWMC’s best
interest,203 the geography-dependent standard should take prece-
dence. This is not to say that vessels and their flag states do not also
have valid interests. Indeed, their interests are vindicated by the
presence of the prohibition on undue delays and detentions in the
first instance.204 Regarding the inherent ambiguity of “undue,”
however, this Note demonstrates that a proposed solution represent-
ing the interests of the port states—the geography-dependent stan-
dard—does more to advance the BWMC as a whole,205 and therefore
should be adopted.
The environmental, economic, and public health ramifications
associated with an aquatic invasive species invasion are also cause
to embrace a geography-dependent “undue” delay and detention
standard. The environmental harm to any region invaded by a
nonindigenous species is staggering.206 Equally staggering is the
economic damage suffered by local economies and industries.207
198. As a simple example, one can imagine the frustration of a ship’s captain who could
recover for a three-day delay in a Mediterranean port but not for the same delay in an Arctic
port. Cf. BMWC supra note 19, art. 12, ¶ 2.
199. See supra Part II.B.2.
200. See TAN, supra note 15, at 169-70; Pamel & Wilkins, supra note 9, at 341 (citing
Brubaker, supra note 162, at 221-43); Puthucherril, supra note 79, at 403; Simpson-Wood,
supra note 8, at 1253.
201. See supra Part I.A.
202. See BWMC, supra note 19, annex at 1.
203. See supra Part II.B.
204. See supra text accompanying note 174. Given their similar structure and objectives,
it is likely that the reasons for which MARPOL parties included an undue delay prohibition
are also at play in the BWMC context.
205. See supra Part II.B.
206. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
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Humans may also suffer adverse health effects from an invasive
species invasion.208 If a given port state cannot effectively inspect a
vessel for fear of unduly delaying or detaining the vessel under an
ambiguous, subjective standard, the port state may violate other
BWMC obligations,209 and the risk of an invasion could rise.210 If the
BWMC is going to prevent any of these consequences, as stated in
its purpose,211 the BWMC should be read to include a geography-
dependent undue delay and detention standard.
CONCLUSION
Capable of causing vast environmental harm, economic catas-
trophe, and human sickness, nonindigenous aquatic invasive species
are one of the largest threats facing aquatic ecosystems around the
globe.212 Ballast water transfer incident to commercial shipping re-
locates thousands of these nuisance species annually.213 Once re-
located, those strong enough to survive are nearly impossible to
eradicate.214 Given the direct link between increased human activity
and increased risk of aquatic invasive species invasion,215 the threat
of such invasion looms increasingly higher over regions like the
Arctic—a pristine, relatively undisturbed wilderness now subject to
increased human activity due to climate change.216
The BWMC seeks “to prevent, minimize[,] and ultimately elimi-
nate the risks to the environment, human health, property[,] and
resources arising from the transfer of Harmful Aquatic Organisms
and Pathogens through the control and management of ships’
Ballast Water and Sediments.”217 The BWMC also seeks “to avoid
unwanted side-effects from that control.”218 Accordingly, the parties
208. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
209. See supra Part I.B.
210. See ROLIM, supra note 36, at 19-20 (describing that proactive, preventative measures
are imperative in stopping invasive species transfer through ballast water exchange).
211. See BWMC, supra note 19, annex at 2.
212. See supra Part I.A.
213. See supra Part I.A.
214. See supra Part I.A.
215. See supra Part I.A.
216. See supra notes 8-17 and accompanying text.
217. BWMC, supra note 19, annex at 2.
218. Id. 
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agree that “[a]ll possible efforts shall be made to avoid a ship being
unduly detained or delayed under Articles 7.2, 8, 9[, and] 10.”219
Unfortunately, as written, the BWMC leaves open the question
of what exactly “undue” means.220 Scholars have keenly identified
this problem and its implications,221 though suggestions for a po-
tential solution are generally lacking.222 As one potential solution,
the standard for what constitutes “undue” can and should be read
to be a geography-dependent standard. That is, when determining
whether a delay or detention was “undue,” the ballast water in-
spection location—in particular the condition of its ecosystem and
the capabilities of the relevant port state—can and should be taken
into consideration. The BWMC’s text supports the proposition that
undue delay and detention can be a geography-dependent standard.
The desire to avoid self-defeat, incentivize compliance, and recog-
nize the reality that different states have different needs and cap-
abilities support the proposition that undue delay and detention
should be a geography-dependent standard.
If the BWMC is going to achieve its purpose, those responsible for
its operation, enforcement, and interpretation must confront the
inherent ambiguity of “undue.” A reasonable, consistent, and ulti-
mately feasible reading of “undue” that resolves this ambiguity is
necessary. Notwithstanding whether a geography-dependent stan-
dard ultimately proves workable, the most important work this Note
will have done is call more attention to and encourage further eval-
uation of this important issue as the BWMC begins its second year
in force.
John R. Bobka*
219. Id. art. 12, ¶ 1.
220. See supra Part II.A.3.
221. See, e.g., Bostrom, supra note 25, at 891.
222. But see supra note 85.
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